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Abstract: This analysis aims at contributing to the debate by exploring recent changes 
in French public hospitals. It will try to show how a new financing system can entail 
deep changes inside the management architecture. The structuring of the management 
control function is still in gestation. In most hospitals surveyed, this function is still at 
its early stages. There is still a long way for management control in acquiring a real 
legitimacy,  especially  from  professionals.  A  key  to  success  lies  in  the  ability  of 
institutions to recruit (and retain) a staff up to the current stakes, both able to overcome 
technical  difficulties  of  the  hospital  management  (including  the  T2A)  and  place 
themselves in intermediation between medical and management logics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In  a  few  decades,  management  control  has  become  a  major  component  of 
management  in  corporate  organisations.  It  arrived  later  in  non-profit  organisations  and 
particularly in public ones. The absence of profit as the unifying theme of the management 
control function (Anthony, 1993), the difficulty of finding a causal relationship between 
resources and outcomes (Anthony & Young, 1988), the absence of a genuine market in 
which the demand can be expressed (Burlaud & Laufer, 1980) explain much of the delay. 
The  particular  nature  of  the  hospital  organisation,  traditionally  seen  as  a  professional 
organisation (Scott, 1982, Bourn & Ezzamel, 1987) or a professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 
1982), where management has a "problem of legitimacy" (Bouquin, 2004), is also an obstacle 
to the development of management control. As Scott said (1982): “Physicians have insisted on 
their prerogative to control over output (patient care) goals; and administrators have tended 
to  accept  the  definition  of  their  own  domain  as  limited  to  organizational  support  or 
maintenance  objectives”.  Therefore,  public  hospitals  in  France  have  long  experienced 
difficulties  in  establishing  and  developing  a  real  management  control  function  (Cauvin  & 
Coyaud, 1990; Moisdon & Tonneau, 1999). 
The arrival of new ways of thinking public management in the 80’s, theorized under the 
expression  “New  Public  Management”  (Hood,  1991)  has  put  forward  those  concepts in 
public organisations. The New Public Management has also diffused its ideas in hospitals. But 
above all, the implementation of new funding systems for hospitals, such as the prospective 
payment system (PPS) in the United States and its epigones in Europe and much of the Western 
world, has profoundly changed the situation. As a matter of fact, the PPS -which “combines the 
elements of public sector contraction and commercial pressures” (Coombs, 1987), entails a 
great uncertainty and a financial risk for hospitals. Thus, it leads to building systems and tools for 
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more sophisticated analysis and cost control (Young & Pearlman, 1993; Hill, 2000). The law 
on financing of French Social Security of 18 December 2003, which introduced a reform of the 
hospitals’  financing  system,  called  "Tarification  à  l'activité"  or  more  generally  "T2A",  is 
following largely these reforms (Schreyögg & al., 2006) and leads the hospital system towards a 
high risk area. 
In  this  context,  the  question  of  management  control  becomes  crucial  for  the 
organisation. However, it is clear that the political-economic environment is not conducive 
to step back and reflect calmly on the subject. The strong financial pressures weighing on 
health care facilities force hospital management to develop short-term strategies and do not 
allow a thorough examination of the purposes of management control. 
This analysis aims at contributing to the debate by exploring recent changes in French 
public hospitals. It will try to show how a new financing system can entail deep changes 
inside the management architecture. 
In  a  first  part,  we  will  highlight  the  paradigm  change  in  hospital  management  and  the 
acceleration of this process since the implementation of the tariff reform. 
The second part of our presentation, which will be largely based on concepts and models 
developed for business corporations, will seek to establish a number of assumptions about 
the possible evolution of the management control function and particularly of its organisation in 
public health facilities. 
In a third part, we will try to compare these assumptions to the reality on the ground and 
in particular, by studying the evolution of the management control in private companies and 
conducting an exploratory study in several hospitals in a French region and on the basis of 
official documents issued by the French Department of Health. 
I - THE REVOLUTION OF PARADIGMS OF HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT 
I.1 - An attempt to transpose the framework of management control of the company 
The French hospital system has known early attempts to transpose patterns from industry 
and trade. Internal contracting is one example. For nearly forty years, long before such steps were 
undertaken in the state services, and before we can speak of management control in the public 
sector, internal contracting structures were established in hospitals. As a matter of fact, the 
concept of responsibility centres has emerged in health care facilities in the early 1970s (Law of 
31 December 1970). The aim of this reform was to curb the level of the hospital expenses that had 
grown to a significant extent since the early 1960s. Despite some experiments, this new 
management fad has had a limited effect (Lévy, 1976). 
The establishment  of the overall budget in  the 1980s  has  given new  impetus to internal 
contracting. But what could have been an opportunity to renew modes of hospital management 
was  in  fact  a  variation  of  the  logic  of  the  overall  allocation  between  health  care funding 
authorities  and  health  care  facilities.  The  results  of  this  experiment  has  not  been  up  to  the 
expectations of its promoters. Critics were quick to rise in the early 1990s : each player used a 
rustical system to its advantage, without consistency or overall plan (Cauvin & Coyaud, 1990). 
The failure to take activity into account for budgets allocation (the budget responsibility centres 
was established on a historical basis) was a major pitfall of the model (Demeestère and Viens, 
1976).  Each facility reproduced  the internal mechanism  for resource allocation  of the overall 
budget with all its limitations: lack of incentives and perpetuation of inequalities. 
The progressive use of the program of medical information systems (PMIS) in the mid-
1990s and the use of this tool as a means of controlling (Lenay, 2005), has reinvigorated the 
internal management. The gradual spread in minds of the idea of medical budgets gave new 
impetus to internal contracting, which had just been brought up to date by the law of 24 Jérôme LARTIGAU 
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April 1996. However, the PMIS -which is an adaptation of the diagnosis-related groups system- 
was not ripe yet for a direct use in responsibility centres. It only covered activities of medicine, 
surgery and obstetrics (MSO), did not take proper account of multiple stays and above all, 
medical activity was not described with sufficient specificity. Moreover, even though it helped 
to "lift the veil of obscurity", the PMIS did not destabilize the system of political relationships that 
characterize the hospital system (Lenay & Moisdon, 2000). Ultimately, the main lesson to be 
learned from this experience is that, as in the industrial company of the early twentieth century, 
devolution has created the need for control. Although initially the aim of management control 
was to follow the instructions or at least the incentives of health authorities, the delegation 
of  management  to  responsibility  centres  provided  the  foundation  for  a  management  control 
function  that  did  not  exist  before.  But  the  model  remained  relatively  unsophisticated:  the 
management control function merely recorded expenditures of responsibility centres, without the 
possibility to understand the origin of resource consumption. The tasks of the employee in 
charge  of  management  analysis  (not  yet  called  "management  controller")  were  mainly 
simple accounting and budgetary activities: monitoring of consumption of products stored or 
not stored, monthly personal expenses, compliance of responsibility centres with budget 
limitations.  The  concept  of  total  revenue  was  not  a  concern  since  the  revenue  level  was 
guaranteed  by  the  overall  budget  allocation.  Activity  indicators  (number  of  admissions  and 
days, occupancy rates and average length of stay) were monitored in a dashboard but were not 
actually operational because funding was independent of activity. In short, control was done 
primarily on the inputs and the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness were largely ignored. 
Moreover, there was no need to use a higher qualification for staff in charge of these missions: the 
most  common  profile  was  a  mid-ranking  executive,  mid-career  and  having  a  taste  for 
accounting and "figures". 
The  implementation  of  the  T2A  has  challenged  the  business  model  in  place  in  most 
hospitals: 
-  In the original model of the PMIS, the so-called “homogeneous groups of patients” (very 
similar to the original diagnosis-related groups) were not directly priced, one should pass 
through  an  index  in  order  to  give  them  a  financial  value
2;  in  the  new  T2A  model, 
homogeneous  groups  of  patients  become  “homogeneous  groups  of  stays”,  which  are 
directly priced in euros. 
-  The expanding range of activities covered by the new pricing, and especially the link between 
the activity and funding is a new challenge for hospitals and a questioning of traditional 
thought patterns of hospital management. 
I.2 - A landscape largely changed by the arrival of the T2A 
The T2A has reintroduced the link between level of activity and funding, which had been 
suppressed by the overall budget (from Pouvourville & Tedesco, 2003). This principle entails 
many consequences which are difficult to assess now. However, we can give an overview: 
I.2.1 - A genuine “medicalization” of budgets responsibility centres 
The T2A confirms and expands the use of PMIS for the allocation of resources internally. 
The PMIS did not allow an optimal allocation of resources, not only because of its limited scope 
(to MSO). The T2A opens a wider scope for medical funding: many activities are subject to a 
financial valuation (chronic renal failure, abortion, emergency switch, etc.). 
Because each clinical activity is directly quoted in euros (as already said, it is no longer 
necessary to pass through the point ISA), it enables a more direct readability of the cost of 
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care. Ultimately, with the T2A, the logic introduced by the PMIS finds its natural extension and 
leads to a medicalization of the “manager gaze” (Moisdon & al., 2006). 
I.2.2 - A reversal of the traditional budgetary logic 
The traditional mode of budget devolution, restricted to expenditures of responsibility centres, 
gave managers an incomplete vision of reality and promoted biddings. The goal was to capture 
the largest possible share of the collective resource to build up a reserve (Cyert & March, 1964). 
The  system  of  bureaucratic  control  involved  in  this  so-called  delegation  generated  a 
"dysfunctional game" (Löning & al., 2003) repeatedly described in academic literature. 
With the T2A, the level of revenue determines the level of expenditures authorized. There are at 
least two consequences in this reversal: 
a)  A complete accounting information and not limited to costs, can make doctors understand 
the economic reality of their activity. In fact, enjoying a more complete information, the medical 
professionals  are  no  longer  in  a  relationship  of  dependency  towards  management,  but  could 
become full partners. A new relationship could be established between traditionally opposed 
parties. 
b)   The introduction of the "income" no longer limits the reasoning on budgets curtailment: 
a  development  of  the  activity  can  be  well  considered  if  it  brings  more  resources  than  it 
consumes.  In  for-profit  organisations,  managers  may  exceed  the  allocated  budget  if  the 
generated profit is bigger than this budget (Anthony, 1993). So far, this was not the case for non-
profit  organisations  such  as  hospitals  ...  but  could  become  a  reality  if  we  follow  the  logic 
induced by the T2A. 
I.2.3 - A new distribution of roles 
In  the  system  of  the  overall  budget  and  its  corollary  -the  budget  delegation  towards 
responsibility  centres, the  general management held all the cards.  It controlled the  upstream 
resource  by  collecting  the  global  endowment,  and  downstream  by  the  budget  allocation 
towards  responsibility  centres.  As  there  was  no  direct  link  with  activity,  physicians  or 
operational managers could not rely on the increase in this activity, in order to ask for additional 
budget. Undeniably, the model of cost control, introduced by the overall budget, gave a strong 
power  to  the  central  services  and  general  management.  Although  this  one  was  generally 
unable to influence the process of “production”, its control of financial resources allowed it 
to offset the medical power. 
Under the system established by the T2A, the production of care has become the major 
means for the funding of the organisation. Operational services -particularly clinical services, 
de facto provide resources for the entire organisation. Indeed, internal contracting can no 
longer rely on a principle of limiting resources without medical fundament -as it was the case 
with  the  overall  budget,  it  requires  the  invention  of  new  management  practices  (De 
Pouvourville & Tedesco, 2003). 
In  this  entirely  redefined  framework,  the  management  control  function  must  be 
renewed and find its position within the organisation. The scope of the management control and 
therefore, of management controllers, is sentenced to metamorphose. 
II  -  POSITION  OF  MANAGEMENT  CONTROL,  AND  GOVERNANCE  OF  THE 
ORGANISATION 
Until recently, the priority given to requests from health authorities did not allow hospitals 
to think about their internal control. Building  internal control  of the hospital in response to 
supervisory procedures conceals the real questions on the nature of management control (Cauvin 
& Coyaud, 1990). Changes in hospital management and, as we have just described it, the mental 
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revolution introduced by the T2A, require to design new control systems and steering from the 
institutions management. 
II. 1 - Management Control and organisation's steering 
As it can be observed in industrial and commercial settings, the management control function 
in  hospitals  is  undergoing  deep  challenges.  Is  the  traditional  bureaucratic  control  system, 
focused on inputs, losing ground to a new framework, more organized around the concept 
of steering? 
The analytical framework developed by Lorino (2003) is a key to highlight this debate. The author 
establishes the concept of “schéma de pilotage” which can be translated by “steering scheme”; 
it can be defined as how the company intends to operate in terms of culture and overall control 
logic (Lorino, 2003). 
Lorino distinguishes two steering logics: 
-  The logic of financial accountability (profit and cost centres) based on the principle of 
individual  accountability  and  delegation  (with  internal  contracting).  The 
organisation  is  divided  into  autonomous  areas  established  as  responsibility  centres;  a 
principle  of  decentralization  is  implemented.  This  logic  is  deeply  rooted  in  the 
theoretical framework of the Agency Theory. 
-  The strategic and operational logic, closely related to the deployment of corporate strategy. 
It is based on a cause/effect analysis that compels to go into the technical core of the 
process.  More  complex  than  the  financial  logic,  it  is  necessary  if  the  business  has 
reached a certain level of integration between the units and functions (interdependencies, 
synergies) and a certain degree of complexity. From a theoretical point of view, this 
logic comes from the Organizational Learning Theory. 
Can this theoretical framework -inspired by the practice of industrial and commercial companies, 
be implemented in  hospital settings?  The  T2A  revives  the  debate: the  logic  of  the  overall 
budget subordinated the activity of  responsibility centres to  the  budget provided by general 
management; now, a new logic determines the level of expenditure on the revenue generated by 
clinical  units.  Thus,  the  logic  of  economic  equilibrium  throughout  the  facility  could  be 
implemented  at  the  clinical  centre  level.  In  a  context  of  full  implementation  of  T2A,  the 
transposition of the model of financial accountability  is not totally  excluded, at least in 
theory. In this sense, clinical directorates could become genuine managers responsible for 
autonomous entities, as can be seen in European countries experimenting PPS (Kurunmäki, 
1999; Vagnoni & Abernethy, 2004). 
The choice of a model rather than another is clearly not without consequences for the definition 
and the "territory" of the management control function. 
II.2 - The evolution of the management control function 
The acknowledgment of management control in French hospitals is relatively recent. In 
many public health facilities, the lack of management control structures and, when they existed, 
the lack of trained professionals, able to grasp the hospital complexity, was often common so far. 
So as to fill this gap, most university hospitals and many community hospitals have established 
specialized services. 
For Bouquin (2004), management control is a key component of corporate governance. As such, 
it helps managers to understand the future and act accordingly; it also helps to steer or control the 
actions of their employees and partners, including, in large structures, what they can’t meet 
directly (Id.). In other words, it is precisely the question of the steering of the organisation. In an 
era  of  scarce  resources  and  PPS,  it  seems  difficult  to  imagine  a  hospital  without  such  a 
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But the issue of the architecture of the management control function still remains: should it be 
centralized or decentralized? And which entity should it depend on? 
II.2.1 - A centralized or decentralized management control? 
As  Lorino  showed  (2003),  the  control  function  can  be  an  autonomous  chain, 
separated from operational functions, or on the contrary, linked to operational functions. 
The choice will be determined by the steering scheme chosen by the leaders. 
Most of the time, when financial logic prevails, the management control function is an autonomous 
entity, separated from operational units and related to the company management. 
On the contrary, in a strategic and operational logic, it is better to bring closer control functions 
and  operational  functions  in  order  to  create  a  real  harmony  between  economic  and 
operational culture. The control chain is then subject to a kind of “professional sponsorship" 
from the central management control department (Lorino, 2003). 
As this distinction shows it, in the first case, the main role of management control is to monitor 
an outcome or a performance of an autonomous entity. In the second case, its main role is to 
back operational units. 
The debate is not new in public health facilities and especially in university hospitals. The large 
size  of  these  institutions,  that  implies  a  great  distance  between  operating  units  and 
management, can lead to advocate a reconciliation of management controllers to these units. 
Most of the time, the structuring of the management control function depends on how general 
managers consider delegation of management. However, decentralization doesn’t mean lack of 
coordination: whatever the mode of organisation selected, there is always a central service that 
coordinates  the  system.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whom  this  coordination  entity  depends  on. 
However, if the issue isn’t new, the introduction of the T2A revives the debate on public health 
facilities. 
II.2.2 - What reporting line for the management control function? 
The  question  is  as  old  as  the  discipline  itself  and  depends  on  the  role  the 
organisation  assigned  to  it  (Bouquin,  2004).  Organisational  choices  are  closely  linked  to 
organisational strategy and none of them is more legitimate than another. The implementation 
of  the  T2A  has  raised  the  issue  within  hospitals:  management  control, as a translator of 
medico-economic  data,  is  at  the  crossroads  of the  financial and organisational logic and can 
legitimately be under the control of the finance or of another department (senior management, 
management information systems...). 
Two different views stand out: 
- The first one is that the management controller guarantees the reliability of accounting 
data. The medicalization of funding introduced by the T2A gives new strength to this view in 
so far as funding is inextricably linked with the extent of the activity. Indeed, the financial 
department needs skills for the treatment of medico-economic information in order to be able to 
build the budget of the establishment. In this view, the management control department can find 
its place in this service easily.  
- The second one makes the management controller a major actor of change. According to 
this view, management control has enlarged its sphere of influence towards the field of strategy 
and  operations,  in  connection  with  operators  benefiting  from  decentralized  responsibilities 
(Bouquin,  2004).  Thus,  the  objective  of  overall  economic  performance  and "engineering  of 
change" assigned to him (Lorino, 1991) argue for an alternative solution. The tariff reform 
is a powerful incentive to organisational change, both in terms of the operational unit and of 
governance. In this case, the incorporation of management control in a department other than the 
financial arises with force. 
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II.3 - The new positioning of the department of medical information (DMI) 
The  DMI  has  an  important  place  in  hospitals,  especially  since  the  Decree  of  20 
September  1994  which  requires  every  health  care  facility  to  collect  and  process  medical 
information on patients for the evaluation of medical activity. In fact, the DMI ensures the recovery 
of data from the PMIS, their quality and then contributes to an optimal seizure of activity. The 
physician  responsible  for  the  DMI  has  become  the  main actor  of PMIS in each institution 
(Lenay, 2005). 
In the context of the overall budget, medical information was not a real issue. With the T2A, it 
becomes vital since the level of activity determines the level of funding. In these circumstances, 
the  role  and  positioning  of  DMI,  a  medical  service  under  the  responsibility  of  a  hospital 
physician but closer to the technostructure than the operational units, raise many questions. 
A first question concerns the nature of the functions of DMI in relation to the typology established 
by Anthony (1988): 
-  On the one hand, many of the actions undertaken by the DMI and in particular those done 
by medical information technicians - MITs - could be considered as an operational control 
(or a tasks control) rather than management control. 
-  But  on  the  other  hand,  the  behavioural  control  exerted  by  the  DMI  on  health 
professionals, and the increasingly strategic value of medical information, can place the 
action  of  DMI  in  the  field  of  management  control.  Thus  would  it  be  a  new  type  of 
management control? 
A second question concerns its location in the structure: as a service in charge of control of 
medical activity, what are its relationships with the management control department? And when 
this one is not clearly identified, what is the department of reference? This is one of the core 
issues hospitals must face, given the increasing medicalization of management control. 
These theoretical questions have to undergo the comparison with field observations. To do this, 
an analysis of results in the industrial and commercial sector is a prerequisite. In a second 
time, this will enable to take stock of the management control function in hospitals. 
III - THE EVOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN ORGANISATIONS 
The  management  control  function  and  the  physiognomy  of  the  management 
ontroller in industrial and commercial settings, have experienced significant changes in the last 
twenty years. And though the corporate world is a priori quite different from that of the hospital, a 
comparison of the evolution of management control in the two sectors may be very interesting. 
III.1 - A significant change of the controller management function in the French 
industrial and commercial sector 
The  observation  of  French  corporate  organisations  attests  the  changing  role  of 
management control and of management controllers. The latest available study has been led by 
Jordan in 1998
3. Though this study is now ten years old, it is a unique material to evaluate the 
evolution  of  the  profession.  As  the  author  recalls  in  the  introduction,  the  standard 
management  control  system  does  not exist and  it  is  strongly dependent on the size of the 
organisation in which it operates (among other contingency factors). A certain number of findings 
of this study are closely linked to our issue. 
First of all, evolutions can be observed between 1989 and 1998: 
-  A strong development of planning tools 
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-  An improved accountability of operational managers on their forecasts and their corrective 
actions 
-  An increased cooperation between management controllers and operational managers 
-  Then, the observations made in 1998 gave the following results: 
-  There is a definition of the job of management controller in most large firms and in half of 
small and medium-sized firms 
-  The head of the central management control department is more often linked to the chief 
financial officer (CFO) (60%) than to the general management (40%) 
-  70% of large companies and 20% of small companies with less than 500 employees have 
decentralized management controllers (in the operational units) 
-  In most large companies, the decentralized management controller is hierarchically linked 
to  the  operational  manager,  even  though  the  affiliation  with  the  management control 
department is gaining ground between 1989 and 1998 (in contrast, in medium-sized 
enterprises, decentralized management controllers are mainly linked to the management 
control department) 
-  Finally,  the  controller’s  role  is  evolving  towards  system  design,  animation  and 
decision support at the expense of a technical role dedicated to the production of data 
These  results  show  a  deep  change  in  management  of  organisations  in  general  and  in 
management control in particular. We can assume that the development of new information 
technologies and communication, the implementation of integrated systems like enterprise 
resource planning software has certainly emphasized the trends highlighted in Jordan's study. 
These  data  are  very  valuable  and  will  guide  our  thinking  on  the  evolution  of  the 
management control function in hospitals. Indeed, if hospital management can’t be compared to 
the one of an industrial and commercial company, the fact remains that management control in 
hospitals  has  often  followed  the  lead  of  its  counterpart  in  the  corporate  sector.  Many 
innovations  observed  in  corporate  settings  have  been  included in  hospitals,  more-or-less 
successfully. Besides, hospital managers have shown a continuous interest in these innovations. 
III.2 - The management control function in hospitals is undergoing deep changes 
III.2.1 - The recognition of the profession of management controller 
The job of management controller is now officially acknowledged, essentially from the 
point of view of management jobs and skills. The directory of occupations designed by the 
Hospitalization and Health Care Provision Department (DHOS is the French acronym) in 2004, 
is an obvious proof of this recognition. This document is the first national tool designed to 
implement a management of jobs and skills and to standardize job descriptions in French 
hospitals. 183 sheets detail each job identified so far, and one of these sheets gives an accurate 
definition of the management controller function. 
Some items in this sheet deserve special attention and especially, the definition of the 
job: “develop and implement methods and tools to ensure efficient use of resources and to 
carry out the steering and control functions by the management”. As this definition shows it, the 
roles of design and animation highlighted in the previous study (Jordan, 1998) clearly appear. 
The hospital management controller in 2004 (date of the edition of the job directory) is no 
longer confined within a technical role limited to the production of accounting data, or at best in 
financial  reporting.  He  is  supposed  to  be  a  central  element  in  the  management  of  the 
organisation. 
The main activities outlined in the specification sheet follow an organisational steering logic. For 
example,  we  can  underline  the  following  items:  “advice  to  the  general  management  and 
administrative and medical management” or “development of tools to help in the definition 
and evaluation of the strategy of the establishment”. These strategic activities are based on 
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know-how required to translate a high level of conceptualization (for instance: “being able to lead 
an advisory and audit mission in economic, financial and organisational fields”). 
From now  on,  this level  of  conceptualization demands a  post-graduate  degree for a  possible 
recruitment.  A  specialization  in  management  control  (obtained  in  a  Business  School  or  at 
University) is considered as a prerequisite for exercising the job. 
The missions described in the sheet confirm the trends identified by Jordan in his study 
(1998): 
a. Decentralization and specialization 
b. Association of operational managers (in our case, medical and paramedical), themselves 
more accountable for their management 
c. Primacy of design functions, to the detriment of technical ones 
The directory's sheet seems to reflect the position and the role of management controllers in 
hospitals. Does this vision fit with the reality observed in the field? 
III.2.2 - Organisational changes in the field: the example of eight hospitals 
We might  think  that a now  well-established presence of management control in many 
public health establishments shows the recognition of the profession of management controller 
by DHOS. What is it really? 
Hospitals are experiencing a relative disparity in the structure of  management control. 
There are many reasons for that: management priorities, lack of dedicated human resources, 
weight  of  the  medical  professionals.  Five  years  have  elapsed  since  the  edition  of  the  job 
directory, and the implementation of the T2A. Has this period been conducive to a strengthening 
of management control?  
We will try to provide some answers through a survey on public hospitals and see the 
structure of management control and its evolution. 
III.2.2.1 - Methodology 
We chose to keep a sample of the eight largest hospitals in a region of France. We thought 
they were likely to host a clearly identified management control department. This sample, which 
represents 87% of the supply of regional public health care, includes large institutions which 
generally  have  a  significant  techno-structure,  and  smaller  institutions,  which  are  less  well 
endowed. All the establishments surveyed are covered by the T2A. 
One of the particularities of the region is that it hosts two university hospitals. This is not 
the only case of redundancy within the same region in France. However, there are significant 
differences in terms of budget, staffing and capacity between the two institutions. 
The collection of information was done by questionnaires sent by email to each CFO of the 
sample in early April 2008 (for the hospital No. 4, the head of the management control department 
has  been  interviewed).  A  telephone  conversation  was  sometimes  necessary  to  clarify  some 
items. The return rate was excellent since we could get 100% of answers. In order to make 
the  responses  anonymous,  institutions  were  ranked  from  1  to  8  in  the  order  of  return  of 
questionnaires. For hospitals No. 1, 2, 5 and 8, the respondent was the CFO. For hospitals No. 3, 
4, 6 and 7, the respondent was the head of the management control department. 
III.2.2.2 - Results of the study 
a)  Preliminary remarks 
Unlike Jordan’s study (1998), the total number of employees of the organisation hasn't 
been chosen as an explanatory variable. The objective was to get a reliable information and to 
enable comparability between the establishments. The way of counting the staff diverges a lot 
from one hospital to another, and any comparison attempt quickly reaches its limits (even for health 
authorities). However, we chose the theoretical  value  of  the  position  so  as  to  compare  the Prospective Payment Systems and Evolution of Management Control in French Hospitals: An Overview 
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number of management controllers (and similar). As a matter of fact, the job may be vacant but 
its theoretical value represents the effort of the institution to ensure the activity. 
The  most  representative  explanatory  variables  are  the  operating  budget,  which  is  an 
inescapable and undeniable datum, and the number of beds and places. On this last point, it should 
be noted that the number of LSO beds could be considered as having a greater relevance than 
the total number of beds and places. Because of its recurrent nature, the LSO activity is 
much more controllable and therefore justifies the use of management controllers more easily. 
However, the total number of beds and places is generally the most commonly used parameter to 
describe the level of capacity. 
Another important remark concerns the workforce to study. And in this case, the task is 
far  from  obvious.  Indeed,  what  are  we  talking  about  exactly?  Are  we  talking  about  the 
management  controllers  identified  as  such  in  the  institution?  Or  the  whole  management 
control department (when this service exists)? 
These questions are crucial. Take the example of hospital No. 4: the management control 
department is composed of genuine management controllers, but also computer specialists, 
administrative staff, and of course managerial staff. 
Choices were required, so we decided to take the overall staff of the management control 
department, because it is the only indicator that can reflect the strike force of the management 
control function within the organisation. As a matter of fact, in some hospital settings, the role of the 
management controllers can be assigned to various employees -sometimes with a different rank, 
although  they  carry  out  the  same  missions.  Finally,  as  previously  said,  the  expression 
"management controller" in hospitals is a function or an occupation, not a rank. Therefore, it is 
very difficult to know the precise number of management controllers in hospitals, and only 
the declarative method enables a relevant information. 
The most relevant indicator for measuring human investment in the management control 
function within the organisation is a ratio, itself divided into two ratios: 
-  The actual whole-time equivalent staff (WTE) of the management control department for 
a range of 100 million euro budget. 
-  The actual whole-time equivalent staff of the management control department for a range 
of 500 beds and places. 
As we will see, the value of each ratio (and thus the relative weight of the management control 
function) can differ between hospitals. 
b) Results of the survey  
b.1) The structuring and positioning of the management control function 
All  establishments  surveyed  have  a  management  control  department  or  at  least  a 
management control function clearly  identified. Apart from hospital  No. 4  which has a long 
established and highly organized department, and hospitals No. 2 and No. 3 which have had a 
management controller  for  nearly a  dozen  years, the development  of  this  service  has  been 
relatively recent for others (less than three years). This observation already gives a glimpse of 
the influence of the T2A in the development of the management control function. In all cases, 
this department is hierarchically linked to the CFO. This fact confirms the trend highlighted in 
Jordan’s study. 
The  recruitment  level  has  become  more  demanding:  a  master  degree  specialized  in 
management control is now commonly requested. All the establishments, except the hospitals No. 
1  and  No.  8,  employ  a  management  controller  with  a  high  academic level.  These  results 
confirm  the growing  professionalization of the job and the  orientation towards design and 
piloting tasks. They are conform to the job directory's specification sheet in all respects and to the 
trends  brought  to  light  by  Jordan’s  study.  One  of  the  effects  of  this  homogenization  of Jérôme LARTIGAU 
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recruitment patterns is the gradual mixing of potential recruits: hospitals get students from the 
same  "stock"  than  other  employers.  This  factor  is  not  without  consequences for  increasingly 
nomadic youth management controllers. 
b.2) Human resources dedicated to the management control function 
As it might be expected, management controllers are more numerous in the largest hospital 
of the region. A policy strongly oriented towards information systems and monitoring during 
many years has enabled this establishment to invest important human and technical means in the 
management control function. With a team of 10.6 WTE (plus 1 WTE management controller 
attached  directly  to  the  CFO),  the  management  control  department  has  got  exceptional 
means, even compared with other similar hospitals. 
These data are given in absolute value. If we take the data into account in relative terms, 
the situation is somewhat less obvious as shown in table 1 below
4: 
Table 1. Human resources dedicated to the management control function 
 
H1  H2  H3  H4  H5  H6  H7  H8 
Operating budget (M€)  75  129  95  675  191  121  282  100 
Number of MSO beds  -  341  -  1908  -  501  -  258 
Total number of beds and places  505  1046  820  2808  1076  814  1332  700 
Management controllers  0.8  1  1  7.8  1.2  1  2  1 
Management control staff  0.8  3  1  11.6  1.2  3  2  1 
Management control staff for 100 M€  1.07  2.33  1.05  1.72  0.63  2.48  0.71  1 
Management control staff for 500 
beds and places 
0.79  1.43  0.61  2.07  0.56  1.84  0.75  0.71 
 
Notes: 
(1)  H means “hospital” 
(2)  Total staff of the management control department 
If we accept the criterion of capacity, hospital No. 4 is at the top end of the sample. However, 
taking the financial criterion into account shows the dominance of hospital No. 6 with a ratio of 
2.48 WTE for 100 M€. 
A  lesson can  be learned from  this empirical observation: technostructure  doesn't necessarily 
grow with the size of the organisation. As a matter of fact, large resources can be devoted to this 
function despite the smaller size of the establishment (in this case, the hospital No. 6). 
Another lesson can be learned: if we examine the management control function more carefully, 
the devoted human resources can actually be higher than those announced. As a matter of fact, 
hospitals have had to implement a new reform so-called "new governance" since 2005. This 
reform has created the "pôle", which is the French equivalent of the clinical directorates (CD)
5. It 
gathers a clinical director (which is a kind of operational manager), a nursing manager and a 
management officer (also called “business manager” in English-speaking studies5). In hospitals 
that have been able to implement this reform (which is the case of hospitals No. 2, No. 4 and No. 
7), this latter function can be considered as a decentralized management controller, even if it 
                                                
4 The staff is counted in whole-time equivalent 
5 The model of clinical directorates has spread widely across European countries; for example, a precise 
description of the structuring of the CDs in Italy is given by Lega (2008) Prospective Payment Systems and Evolution of Management Control in French Hospitals: An Overview 
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doesn't benefit from this designation formally. As most of the companies with more than 500 
employees  surveyed  in  Jordan’s  study,  these  controllers  hierarchically  depend  on  the  local 
manager (in our case, the clinical director), even though a strong functional relationship exists 
with central management controllers. Therefore, to measure the actual weight of the management 
control function, we must count the actual staff of management controllers. That includes all the 
management controllers (or similar), even those working in CDs. Therefore, as shown in table 2 
below, the numerical weight of the management control function can be very significant: 
Table 2. The numerical weight of the management control function 
  H1  H2  H3  H4  H5  H6  H7  H8 
Operating budget (M€)  75  129  95  675  191  121  282  100 
Number of MSO beds  -  341  -  1908  -  501  -  258 
Total number of beds and places  505  1046  820  2808  1076  814  1332  700 
Management controllers  0.8  1  1  7.8  1.2  1  2  1 
Management control staff  0.8  3  1  11.6  1.2  3  2  1 
Management control staff for 100 M€  1.07  2.33  1.05  1.72  0.63  2.48  0.71  1 
Management control staff for 500 
beds and places  0.79  1.43  0.61  2.07  0.56  1.84  0.75  0.71 
CDs’ management officers  0.5  3  0  14  0  0.8  5  0 
Total staff of the management control 
function  1.3  6  1  25.6  1.2  3.8  7  1 
For 100 M€  1.73  4.65  1.05  3.79  0.63  3.14  2.48  1 
For 500 beds and places  1.29  2.87  0.61  4.56  0.56  2.33  2.63  0.71 
b.3) Missions of management controllers 
The  tasks  of  the  classical  management  controller  such  as  the  production  of 
dashboards,  updating  of  data  from  management  accounting,  monitoring  of 
expenditure,  are  still  the  bedrock  of  the  job.  The  "securing"  of  accounting  data  and  the 
production of figures are a prerequisite for meaningful dialogue with CD
6s. We can notice the 
emergence of revenue dashboards, which require highly accurate tracking, especially with a T2A 
rate of 100%. 
Next to  these  traditional missions, the results of the questionnaire highlight new ones. 
Hospital No. 4, for example, distinguishes three transverse missions: an informative mission 
(oriented towards production of figures), a financial mission (monitoring of expenditure and 
revenue) and a strategic mission (benchmarking and medico-economic studies). This latter role, 
although not clearly identified, appears in watermark in the answers of other hospitals. 
b.4) Relations with the DMI 
In general, relationships between the management control department and the DMI are 
close. There is nothing surprising given the new momentum generated by the T2A on medical 
data. The DMI controls the management of PMIS: it feeds the data base of medical activity that 
will be used later for the medico-economic studies led by the management controller. 
If the DMI lies at the heart of medical information, it is not necessarily limited to operational 
control and its role may be extended to tasks originally assigned exclusively to management 
                                                
6 See Bloomfield & Coombs (1992); Robbins (2007) Jérôme LARTIGAU 
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controllers: “The DMI analyses the results of the CDs in relation with the management control 
department and the CFO” (Hospital No. 5). In a way, the medicalization of budgets introduced 
by the PMIS and strengthened by the T2A brought a “medical gaze” in the accounting analysis. 
This close collaboration between the DMI, financial services and management control can lead 
to mixing those departments in a medico-economic cluster. This integrated structure, that can be 
observed in hospitals No. 1 and 6, perhaps foreshadows the future organisation of services for 
analysis and decision support. 
b.5) Influence of the T2A on management control 
Undoubtedly, the T2A is a factor in the development of management control. To the question 
"Has the T2A changed the role of management controller?", all the hospitals surveyed replied 
"yes". Most of them gave structured answers and some major axis can be identified: 
-  The  income  dimension  becomes  prominent  in  hospital  management.  As  one 
establishment  said,  “The  T2A  put  revenue  at  the  heart  of  the  funding  system". 
Therefore, "hospital management, ethical questions set aside, comes more and more closer to 
corporate  management  where  unprofitable  activities,  although  essential,  must  be 
financed by profitable activities” (hospital 4). 
-  In this new framework, the retrospective analysis gives way to a "prospective analysis 
of the activity's evolution" (hospital 2). There must be "(...) a role of foresight in relation 
to activity forecasts (Hospital No. 5). 
-  The management controller sees his role evolving: it "helps decision-making through 
analysis of the profitability of the establishment's future operations (hospital 2), it “must 
be  an  educationalist  to  explain  reforms  at  best,  and  their  impact  in  the  daily 
management of CDs” (Hospital No. 5). 
The  traditional  missions  of  the  management  controller  still  exist  in  spite  of  these  new 
guidelines  identified  for  the  management  control  function.  There  isn’t  a  substitution 
phenomenon but rather, a kind of "sedimentation". In order to have a clear and consistent 
message, it is necessary to  have indisputable tools. “Because the level of income  is  directly 
related to the level of activity, management problems now affect field actors. This implies 
the need for an information system and for effective dashboards” (Hospital No. 4). And so, 
people who are able to handle them... 
b.6) The future of the management control function 
According  to  most  hospitals  surveyed,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  management  control 
function is going to go through big changes. 
The main trends are: 
- A strengthened positioning in the organisation: 
“the management controller will become a central player in the system” (Hospital No. 5). It 
must be in permanent contact with the central services (finance, information systems, DMI) and 
the CDs. The management controller is certainly going to become the interface between staff 
and line and not just the general management’s right hand. 
- A role which is clearly evolving towards expertise: 
“it should enable an informed decision (...) in the context of the T2A (...)" (Hospital No. 5); 
"(...) medico-economic studies on the financial efficiency before implementation of any new 
activity  or  purchase  of  expensive  equipment”  (hospital  3).  -  Ultimately,  a  role  of  internal 
service provider in connection with strategic directions of the institution: 
As hospital No. 2 summed it up very well: “(...) It is a new job that will go beyond ‘the 
person in charge of costs’ to become a job of strategy consulting and of steering assistance, 
which reconciles support to strategic decisions and strengthening of ties with field actors.” Prospective Payment Systems and Evolution of Management Control in French Hospitals: An Overview 
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CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The management control function in hospitals has undergone big changes in recent years. 
Management control was traditionally based on budget limitation. This type of control is giving 
way to a new form of control, which increasingly looks like what Demeestère (2002) calls the 
"performance  management".  In  this  respect,  the  T2A  is  a  powerful  lever  of  change.  By 
questioning the way financial resources are allocated, the tariff reform is far from merely a 
technical measure but alters the sense  of collective action. By giving a monetary  value to 
clinical activity, the T2A has introduced an economic dimension in assessing the performance 
of clinical units. Clinicians can no longer ignore the economic impact of their medical choices. 
Now, they are now accountable to others for their decisions (Bourn & Ezzamel, 1986; Preston, 
1992). 
As  a  consequence,  the  job  of  management  controller  is  experiencing  a  fundamental 
change: initially seen as a "watchdog" or a kind of "Big Brother", the management controller is 
becoming a service provider for CDs and clinicians. As said Harrison & Pollitt for hospital 
accountants (1986), it “moved away from the negative control aspects of accountancy to the 
positive  provision  of  an  information  service  to  the  clinicians”.  His  level  of  qualification 
required now, the tasks he is given, make him an interlocutor that can't be ignored and a first-
rank strategic player (Demeestère & al., 2004). 
Therefore, public health facilities, at least the most advanced in the structuring of the 
management control function, must now think about the purposes of the control system and try 
to develop a “management pattern” (Demeestère & al., 2004) or a "steering pattern" (Lorino, 
2003) in agreement with the new budgetary and accounting framework introduced by the T2A. 
The task will certainly be delicate because it challenges the mental representation of the 
various  stakeholders,  including  general  managers.  It  requires  accountability  of  the  various 
protagonists and the gathering of the separated spheres of the economic and of the medical 
(Claveranne & Pascal, 2005). And of course, it also requires the ending of the traditional clash 
between  doctors  and  managers.  Although  difficult,  this  task  is  necessary:  the  evolution  of 
management  control  in  hospitals  has  not  dispelled  the  ambiguity  that  Löning  &  al.  (2003) 
described for industrial and commercial settings (quite transposable in the hospital environment). 
This fundamental ambiguity, which arose from the difficulty in determining internal clients of 
management control (general management or operational units?) must be lifted sooner or later. 
Otherwise we would face the revival of traditional conflicts in hospitals in addition to classical 
phenomena of power perimeters, common to all organisations. Therefore, a vast organisational 
change arises in public health facilities: the implementation of the T2A puts clinical units and 
CDs on the forefront. As already noted, their level of activity determines the financial resources 
of the whole institution. A rethinking of the management architecture, in particular the scope for 
action, autonomy and perimeter of CDs, has become crucial. 
The structuring of the management control function is still in gestation. In most hospitals 
surveyed, this function is still at its early stages. There is still a long way for management 
control in acquiring a real legitimacy, especially from professionals. A key to success lies in the 
ability  of  institutions  to  recruit  (and  retain)  a  staff  up  to  the  current  stakes,  both  able  to 
overcome technical difficulties of the hospital management (including the T2A!) and place 
themselves in intermediation between medical and management logics. 
But above all, the question lies in how hospitals define the essentials of the management 
control  function.  For  historical  reasons,  management  control  most  often  remains  under  the 
control of the CFO. Yet, the rise of CDs entails a need for managerial skills for which few 
institutions were able to answer so far. Establishments that have devoted human resources for 
this new mission, have appointed dedicated officers. In our opinion, this new job seems to fill the Jérôme LARTIGAU 
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criteria used to define the decentralized management controller in corporate settings (Jordan, 
1998; Corfmat et al., 2000). It must be noted that this decentralized management control function 
is not acknowledged as such in hospitals. Does this lack of institutional recognition show the fear 
of general managers to see the centre of gravity of management control moving? 
This study could not exhaust the subject. For example, management control has not been 
studied  in  private  health  facilities,  which  are  also  subject  to  strong  financial  pressures.  The 
results of our study, however, enable to identify several avenues for future research: 
-  The  role  and  position  of the  managers  in CDs.  This job  previously  existed  in  some 
hospitals, but the law on the "new governance" (2005) has helped with giving it an official status. 
Further investigation on this new position could help to identify new trends in management 
control as a whole. It could also help to define a new steering pattern for hospitals. 
- The evolution of the management control function within hospitals can no longer do 
without the missions and the positioning of the DMI. The importance of analysis and quality 
control for PMIS  data, the link between these missions and strategy of the hospital, give it 
considerable  weight. Most often with no  hierarchical  link  with management, the DMI is an 
autonomous actor sometimes in territorial dispute with the management control department. The 
development of a medicalized management control, consequence of the PMIS and the T2A, 
undoubtedly strengthens the position of specialists in medical information. Therefore, will the 
DMI be exclusively  in  charge  of the  management control  in the future,  or will this  one be 
exercised on a shared basis between the main actors (and if so, how)? 
We think that issue is a promising research topic. 
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